Abstract. The interest in post-quantum cryptography -classical systems that remain secure in the presence of a quantum adversary -has generated elegant proposals for new cryptosystems. Some of these systems are set in the random oracle model and are proven secure relative to adversaries that have classical access to the random oracle. We argue that to prove post-quantum security one needs to prove security in the quantum-accessible random oracle model where the adversary can query the random oracle with quantum states. We begin by separating the classical and quantum-accessible random oracle models by presenting a scheme that is secure when the adversary is given classical access to the random oracle, but is insecure when the adversary can make quantum oracle queries. We then set out to develop generic conditions under which a classical random oracle proof implies security in the quantum-accessible random oracle model. We introduce the concept of a history-free reduction which is a category of classical random oracle reductions that basically determine oracle answers independently of the history of previous queries, and we prove that such reductions imply security in the quantum model. We then show that certain post-quantum proposals, including ones based on lattices, can be proven secure using history-free reductions and are therefore postquantum secure. We conclude with a rich set of open problems in this area.
Introduction
The threat to existing public-key systems posed by quantum computation [Sho97] has generated considerable interest in post-quantum cryptosystems, namely systems that remain secure in the presence of a quantum adversary. A promising direction is lattice-based cryptography, where the underlying problems are related to finding short vectors in high dimensional lattices. These problems have so far remained immune to quantum attacks and some evidence suggests that they may be hard for quantum computers [Reg02] .
As it is often the case, the most efficient constructions in lattice-based cryptography are set in the random oracle (RO) model [BR93] . For example, Gentry, Peikert, and Vaikuntanathan [GPV08] give elegant random oracle model constructions for existentially unforgeable signatures and for identity-based encryption. Gordon, Katz, and Vaikuntanathan [GKV10] construct a random oracle model group signature scheme. Boneh and Freeman [BF11] give a random oracle homomorphic signature scheme and Cayrel et al. [CLRS10] give a latticebased signature scheme using the Fiat-Shamir random oracle heuristic. Some of these lattice constructions can now be realized without random oracles, but at a significant cost in performance [CHKP10, ABB10a, Boy10] .
Modeling Random Oracles for Quantum Attackers. While quantum resistance is good motivation for lattice-based constructions, most random oracle systems to date are only proven secure relative to an adversary with classical access to the random oracle. In this model the adversary is given oracle access to a random hash function O : {0, 1}
* → {0, 1} * and it can only "learn" a value O(x) by querying the oracle O at the classical state x. However, to obtain a concrete system, the random oracle is eventually replaced by a concrete hash function thereby enabling a quantum attacker to evaluate this hash function on quantum states. To capture this issue in the model, we allow the adversary to evaluate the random oracle "in superposition", that is, the adversary can submit quantum states |ϕ = α x |x to the oracle O and receives back the evaluated state α x |O(x) (appropriately encoded to make the transformation unitary). We call this the quantum(-accessible) random oracle model. It complies with similar efforts from learning theory [BJ99, SG04] and computational complexity [BBBV97] where oracles are quantum-accessible, and from lower bounds for quantum collision finders [AS04] . Still, since we are only interested in classical cryptosystems, honest parties and the scheme's algorithms can access O only via classical bit strings.
Proving security in the quantum-accessible RO model is considerably harder than in the classical model. As a simple example, consider the case of digital signatures. A standard proof strategy in the classical settings is to choose randomly one of the adversary's RO queries and embed in the response a given instance of a challenge problem. One then hopes that the adversary uses this response in his signature forgery. If the adversary makes q random oracle queries, then this happens with probability 1/q and since q is polynomial this success probability is sufficiently high for the proof of security in the classical setting. Unfortunately, this strategy fails completely in the quantum-accessible random oracle model since every random oracle query potentially evaluates the random oracle at exponentially many points. Therefore, embedding the challenge in one response will be of no use to the reduction algorithm. This simple example shows that proving security in the classical RO model does not necessarily prove postquantum security.
More abstractly, the following common classical proof techniques are not known to carry over to the quantum settings offhand:
-Adaptive Programmability: The classical random oracle model allows a simulator to program the answers of the random oracle for an adversary, often adaptively. Since the quantum adversary can query the random oracle with a state in superposition, the adversary may get some information about all exponentially many values right at the beginning, thereby making it difficult to program the oracle adaptively. -Extractability/Preimage Awareness: Another application of the random oracle model for classical adversaries is that the simulator learns the pre-images the adversary is interested in. This is, for example, crucial to simulate decryption queries in the security proof for OAEP [FOPS01] . For quantumaccessible oracles the actual query may be hidden in a superposition of exponentially many states, and it is unclear how to extract the right query. -Efficient Simulation: In the classical world, we can simulate an exponentialsize random oracle efficiently via lazy sampling: simply pick random but consistent answers "on the fly". With quantum-accessible random oracles the adversary can evaluate the random oracle on all inputs simultaneously, making it harder to apply the on-demand strategy for classical oracles. -Rewinding/Partial Consistency: Certain random oracle proofs [PS00] require rewinding the adversary, replaying some hash values but changing at least a single value. Beyond the usual problems of rewinding quantum adversaries, we again encounter the fact that we may not be able to change hash values unnoticed. We note that some form of rewinding is possible for quantum zero-knowledge [Wat09].
We do not claim that these problems are insurmountable. In fact, we show how to resolve the issue of efficient simulation by using (quantum-accessible) pseudorandom functions. These are pseudorandom functions where the quantum distinguisher can submit quantum states to the pseudorandom or random oracle. By this technique, we can efficiently simulate the quantum-accessible random oracle through the (efficient) pseudorandom function. While pseudorandom functions where the distinguisher may use quantum power but only gets classical access to the function can be derived from quantum-immune pseudorandom generators [GGM86] , it is an open problem if the stronger quantum-accessible pseudorandom functions exist. Note, too, that we do not seek to solve the problems related to the random oracle model which appear already in the classical settings [CGH98]. Instead we show that for post-quantum security one should allow for quantum access to the random oracle in order to capture attacks that are available when the hash function is eventually instantiated.
Our Contributions
Separation. We begin with a separation between the classical and quantumaccessible RO models by presenting a two-party protocol which is:
-secure in the classical random oracle model, -secure against quantum attackers with classical access to the random oracle model, but insecure under any implementation of the hash function, and -insecure in the quantum-accessible random oracle model.
The protocol itself assumes that (asymptotically) quantum computers are faster than classical (parallel) machines and uses the quadratic gap due to Grover's algorithms and its application to collision search [BHT98] to separate secure from insecure executions.
Constructions. Next, we set out to give general conditions under which a classical RO proof implies security for a quantum RO. Our goal is to provide generic tools by which authors can simply state that their classical proof has the "right" structure and therefore their proof implies quantum security. We give two flavors of results:
-For signatures, we define a proof structure we call a history-free reduction which roughly says that the reduction answers oracle queries independently of the history of queries. We prove that any classical proof that happens to be a history-free reduction implies quantum existential unforgeability for the signature scheme. We then show that the GPV random oracle signature scheme [GPV08] has a history-free reduction and is therefore secure in the quantum settings. Next, we consider signature schemes built from claw-free permutations. [Unr10] ) secure in Canetti's universal composition (UC) framework [Can01] against classical adversaries, then the protocol is also resistant against (computationally bounded resp. unbounded) quantum adversaries. This, however, means that the underlying protocol must already provide strong security guarantees in the first place, namely, universal composition security, which is typically more than the aforementioned schemes in the literature satisfy. This also applies to similar results by Hallgren et al.
[HSS11] for so-called simulation-based security notions for the starting protocol. Furthermore, all these results do not seem to be applicable immediately to the random oracle model where the quantum adversary now has quantum access to the random function (but where the ideal functionality for the random oracle in the UC framework would have only been defined for classical access according to the classical protocol specification), and where the question of instantiation is an integral step which needs to be considered.
Preliminaries
A non-negative function ǫ = ǫ(n) is negligible if, for all polynomials p(n) we have that ǫ(n) < p(n) −1 for all sufficiently large n. The variational distance between two distributions D 1 and D 2 over Ω is given by
If the distance between two output distributions is ǫ, the difference in probability of the output satisfying a certain property is at most ǫ.
A classical randomized algorithm A can be thought of in two ways. In the first, A is given an input x, A makes some coin tosses during its computation, and ultimately outputs some value y. We denote this action by A(x) where A(x) is a random variable. Alternatively, we can give A both its input x and randomness r in which case we denote this action as A(x; r). For a classical algorithm, A(x; r) is deterministic. An algorithm A runs in probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) if it runs in polynomial time in the security parameter (which we often omit from the input for sake of simplicity).
Quantum Computation
We briefly give some background on quantum computation and refer to [NC00] for a more complete discussion. A quantum system A is associated to a (finitedimensional) complex Hilbert space H A with an inner product ·|· . The state of the system is described by a vector |ϕ ∈ H A such that the Euclidean norm |ϕ = ϕ|ϕ is 1. Given quantum systems A and B over spaces H A and H B , respectively, we define the joint or composite quantum system through the tensor product H A ⊗ H B . The product state of |ϕ A ∈ H A and |ϕ B ∈ H B is denoted by |ϕ A ⊗ |ϕ B or simply |ϕ A |ϕ B . An n-qubit system lives in the joint quantum system of n two-dimensional Hilbert spaces. The standard orthonormal computational basis |x for such a system is given by |x 1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |x n for x = x 1 . . . x n . Any (classical) bit string x is encoded into a quantum state as |x . An arbitrary pure n-qubit state |ϕ can be expressed in the computational basis as |ϕ = x∈{0,1} n α x |x where α x are complex amplitudes obeying x∈{0,1} n |α x | 2 = 1.
Transformations. Evolutions of quantum systems are described by unitary transformations with I A being the identity transformation on register A. Given a joint quantum system over H A ⊗ H B and a transformation U A acting only on H A , it is understood that U A |ϕ A |ϕ B refers to (U A ⊗ I B ) |ϕ A |ϕ B . Information can be extracted from a quantum state |ϕ by performing a positive-operator valued measurement (POVM) M = {M i } with positive semidefinite measurement operators M i that sum to the identity i M i = I. Outcome i is obtained with probability p i = ϕ| M i |ϕ . A special case are projective measurements such as the measurement in the computational basis of the state |ϕ =
x α x |x which yields outcome x with probability |α x | 2 . We can also do a partial measurement on some of the qubits. The probability of the partial measurement resulting in a string x is the same as if we measured the whole state, and ignored the rest of the qubits. In this case, the resulting state will be the same as |φ , except that all the strings inconsistent with x are removed. This new state will not have a norm of 1, so the actual superposition is obtained by dividing by the norm. For example, if we measure the first n bits of |φ = x,y α x,y |x, y , we will obtain the measurement x with probability y ′ |α 
m maps the first n + m qubits from basis state |x |y to basis state |x |y ⊕ O i (x) for x ∈ {0, 1} n and y ∈ {0, 1} m . If we require the access to O i to be classical instead of quantum, the first n bits of the state are measured before applying the unitary transformation corresponding to O i . Notice that any quantum-accessible oracle can also be used as a classical oracle. Note that the algorithm A Q may also receive some input |ψ .
To introduce asymptotics we assume that A Q is actually a sequence of such transformation sequences, indexed by parameter n, and that each transformation sequence is composed out of quantum systems for input, output, oracle calls, and work space (of sufficiently many qubits). To measure polynomial running time, we assume that each U i is approximated (to sufficient precision) by members of a set of universal gates (say, Hadamard, phase, CNOT and π/8; for sake of concreteness [NC00]), where at most polynomially many gates are used. Furthermore, T = T (n) is assumed to be polynomial, too. Note that T also bounds the number of oracle queries.
We define the Euclidean distance ||φ − |ψ | between two states as the value
2 where |φ = x α x |x and |ψ = x β x |x . Define q r (|φ t ) to be the magnitude squared of r in the superposition of query t. We call this the query probability of r in query t. If we sum over all t, we get the total query probability of r.
We will be using the following lemmas:
Lemma 2.1 ([BBBV97] Theorem 3.1). Let |ϕ and |ψ be quantum states with Euclidean distance at most ǫ. Then, performing the same measurement on |ϕ and |ψ yields distributions with statistical distance at most 4ǫ. 
n be a set of time-string pairs such that (t,r)∈S q r (|φ t ) ≤ ǫ. If we modify O into an oracle O ′ which answers each query r at time t by providing the same string R (which has been independently sampled at random), then the Euclidean distance between the final states of A Q when invoking O and O ′ is at most √ T ǫ.
Quantum-Accessible Random Oracles
In the classical random oracle model [BR93] all algorithms used in the system are given access to the same random oracle. In the proof of security, the reduction algorithm answers the adversary's queries with consistent random answers.
In the quantum settings, a quantum attacker issues a random oracle query which is itself a superposition of exponentially many states. The reduction algorithm must evaluate the random oracle at all points in the superposition. To ensure that random oracle queries are answered consistently across queries, it is convenient to assume that quantum-resistant pseudorandom functions exist, and to implement this auxiliary random oracle with such a PRF.
Definition 2.3 (Pseudorandom Function).
A quantum-accessible pseudorandom function is an efficiently computable function PRF where, for all efficient quantum algorithms D,
where ǫ = ǫ(n) is negligible in n, and where O is a random oracle, the first probability is over the keys k of length n, and the second probability is over all random oracles and the sampling of the result of D.
We note that, following Watrous [Wat09], indistinguishability as above should still hold for any auxiliary quantum state σ given as additional input to D (akin to non-uniformity for classical algorithms). We do not include such auxiliary information in our definition in order to simplify.
We say that an oracle O ′ is computationally indistinguishable from a random oracle if, for all polynomial time quantum algorithms with oracle access, the variational distance of the output distributions when the oracle is O ′ and when the oracle is a truly random oracle O is negligible. Thus, simulating a random oracle with a quantum-accessible pseudorandom function is computationally indistinguishable from a true random oracle.
We remark that, instead of assuming that quantum-accessible PRFs exist, we can often carry out security reductions relative to a random oracle. Consider, for example, a signature scheme (in the quantum-accessible random oracle model) which we prove to be unforgeable for quantum adversaries, via a reduction to the one-wayness of a trapdoor permutation against quantum inverters. We can then formally first claim that the scheme is unforgeable as long as inverting the trapdoor permutation is infeasible even when having the additional power of a quantum-accessible random oracle; only in the next step we can then conclude that this remains true in the standard model, if we assume that quantum-accessible pseudorandom functions exist and let the inverter simulate the random oracle with such a PRF. We thus still get a potentially reasonable security claim even if such PRFs do not exist. This technique works whenever we can determine the success of the adversary (as in case of inverting a one-way function).
Hard Problems for Quantum Computers
We will use the following general notion of a hard problem.
Definition 2.4 (Problem).
A problem is a pair P = (Game P , α P ) where Game P specifies a game that a (possibly quantum) adversary plays with a classical challenger. The game works as follows:
• On input 1 n , the challenger computes a value x, which it sends to the adversary as its input
• The adversary is then run on x, and is allowed to make classical queries to the challenger.
• The adversary then outputs a value y, which it sends to the challenger.
• The challenger then looks at x, y, and the classical queries made by the adversary, and outputs 1 or 0.
The value α P is a real number between 0 (inclusive) and 1 (exclusive). It may also be a function of n, but for this paper, we only need constant α P , specifically α P is always 0 or 1 2 .
We say that an adversary A wins the game Game P if the challenger outputs 1. We define the advantage Adv A,P of A in problem P as
Definition 2.5 (Hard Problem).
A problem P = (Game P , α P ) is hard for quantum computers if, for all polynomial time quantum adversaries A, Adv A,P is negligible.
Cryptographic Primitives
For this paper, we define the security of standard cryptographic primitives in terms of certain problems being hard for quantum computers. We give a brief sketch here and refer to the appendix for supplementary details.
A trapdoor function F is secure if Inv(F ) = (Game INV (F ), 0) is a hard problem for quantum computers, where in Game INV , an adversary is given a random element y and public key, and succeeds if it can output an inverse for y relative to the public key. A preimage sampleable trapdoor function, F , is secure if Inv(F ) as described above is hard, and if Col(F ) = (Game Col (F ), 0) is hard for quantum computers, where in Game Col , an adversary is given a public key, succeeds if it can output a collision relative to that public key. A signature scheme S is secure if the game Sig-Forge(S) = (Game Sig (S), 0) is hard, where Game Sig is the standard existential unforgeability under a chosen message attack game. Lastly, a private (resp. public) key encryption scheme E is secure if Sym-CCA(E) = (Game Sym (E), 1 2 ) (resp. Asym-CCA(E) = (Game Asym (E), 1 2 )), where Game Sym is the standard private key CCA attack game, and Game Asym is the standard public key attack game.
Separation Result
In this section, we discuss a two-party protocol that is provably secure in the random oracle model against both classical and quantum adversaries with classical access to the random oracle (and when using quantum-immune primitives). We then use the polynomial gap between the birthday attack and a collision finder based on Grover's algorithm to show that the protocol remains secure for certain hash functions when only classical adversaries are considered, but becomes insecure for any hash function if quantum adversaries are allowed. Analyzing the protocol in the stronger quantum random oracle model, where we grant the adversary quantum access to the random oracle, yields the same negative result.
Preliminaries
We start this section by presenting the necessary definitions and assumptions for our construction. For sake of simplicity, we start with a quantum-immune identification scheme to derive our protocol; any other primitive or protocol can be used in a similar fashion.
Identification Schemes. An identification scheme IS consists of three efficient algorithms (IS.KGen, P, V) where IS.KGen on input 1 n returns a key pair (sk, pk). The joint execution of P(sk, pk) and V(pk) then defines an interactive protocol between the prover P and the verifier V. At the end of the protocol V outputs a decision bit b ∈ {0, 1}. We assume completeness in the sense that for any honest prover the verifier accepts the interaction with output b = 1. Security of identification schemes is usually defined by considering an adversary A that first interacts with the honest prover to obtain some information about the secret key. In a second stage, the adversary then plays the role of the prover and has to make a verifier accept the interaction. We say that an identification scheme is sound if the adversary can convince the verifier with negligible probability only.
(Near-)Collision-Resistant Hash Functions. A hash function H = (H.KGen, H.Eval) is a pair of efficient algorithms such that H.KGen for input 1 n returns a key k (which contains 1 n ), and H.Eval for input k and M ∈ {0, 1} * deterministically outputs a digest H.Eval(k, M ). For a random oracle H we use k as a "salt" and consider the random function H(k, ·). The hash function is called near-collision-resistant if for any efficient algorithm A the probability that for
is negligible (as a function of n).
Here we denote by x| ℓ the leading ℓ bits of the string x. Note that for ℓ = n the above definition yields the standard notion of collision-resistance.
In the classical setting, (near-)collision-resistance for any hash function is upper bounded by the birthday attack. This generic attack states that for any hash function with n bits output, an attacker can find a collision with probability roughly 1/2 by probing 2 n/2 distinct and random inputs. For random oracles this attack is optimal.
Grover's Algorithm and Quantum Collision Search. Grover's algorithm [Gro96, Gro98] performs a search on an unstructured database with N elements in time O( √ N ) while the best classical algorithm requires O(N ) steps. Roughly, this is achieved by using superpositions to examine all entries "at the same time". Brassard et al. [BHT98] showed that this speed-up can also be obtained for solving the collision problem for a hash function H : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} n . Therefore, one first selects a subset K of the domain {0, 1}
* and then applies Grover's algorithm on an indicator function f that tests for any input M ∈ {0, 1} * \K if there exists an
evaluations of H with probability at least 1/2.
Computational and Timing Assumptions. To allow reasonable statements about the security of our protocol we need to formalize assumptions concerning the computational power of the adversary and the time that elapses on quantum and classical computers. We first demand that the speed-up one can gain by using a parallel machine with many processors, is bounded by a fixed term. This basically resembles the fact that in the real world there is only a concrete and finite amount of equipment available that can contribute to such a performance gain.
Assumption 1 (Parallel Speed-Up) Let T (C) denote the time that is required to solve a problem C on a classical computer, and T P (C) is the required time that elapses on a parallel system. Then, there exist a constant α ≥ 1, such that for any problem C it holds that
We also introduce two assumptions regarding the time that is needed to evaluate a hash function or to send a message between two parties. Note that both assumptions are merely for the sake of convenience, as one could patch the idea by relating the timings more rigorously. The first assumption states that the time that is required to evaluate a hash function H is independent of the input and the computational environment.
Assumption 2 (Unit Time) For any hash function H and any input message M (resp. M Q for quantum-state inputs) the evaluation of H(M ) requires a constant time T (H(M )) = T P (H(M )) = T Q (H(M Q )) (where T Q denotes the time that elapses on a quantum computer).
Furthermore, we do not charge any extra time for sending and receiving messages, or for any computation other than evaluating a hash function (e.g., maintaining lists of values).
Assumption 3 (Zero Time) Any computation or action that does not require the evaluation of a hash function, costs zero time.
The latter assumption implicitly states that the computational overhead that quantum algorithms may create to obtain a speed-up is negligible when compared to the costs of a hash evaluation. This might be too optimistic in the near future, as indicated by Bernstein [Ber09] . That is, Bernstein discussed that the overall costs of a quantum computation can be higher than of massive parallel computation. However, as our work addresses conceptional issues that arise when efficient quantum computers exist, this assumption is somewhat inherent in our scenario.
Construction
We now present our identification scheme between a prover P and a verifier V (see Figure 1) The main idea is to augment a secure identification scheme IS by a collision-finding stage for some hash function H. In this first stage, the verifier checks if the prover is able to produce collisions on a hash function in a particular time. More precisely, the verifier starts for timekeeping to evaluate the hash function H.Eval(k, ·) on the messages c for c = 1, 2, . . . , 
holds for the first ℓ bits. One round of the collision-stage ends if the verifier either receives such a collision or finishes its 3 √ 2 ℓ hash evaluations. The verifier and the receiver then repeat such a round r = poly(n) times, sending a fresh key k in each round.
Subsequently, both parties run the standard identification scheme. At the end, the verifier accepts if the prover was able to find enough collisions in the first stage or identifies correctly in the second stage. Thus, as long as the prover is not able to produce collisions in the required time, the protocol mainly resembles the IS protocol.
Completeness of the IS * protocol follows easily from the completeness of the underlying IS scheme.
Security against Classical and Quantum Adversaries. To prove security of our protocol, we need to show that an adversary A after interacting with an honest prover P * , can subsequently not impersonate P * such that V * will accept the identification. Let ℓ be such that ℓ > 6 log(α) where α is the constant reflecting the bounded speed-up in parallel computing from Assumption (1). By assuming that IS = (IS.KGen, P, V) is a quantum-immune identification scheme, we can show that IS * is secure in the standard random oracle model against classical and quantum adversaries.
The main idea is that for the standard random oracle model, the ability of finding collisions is bounded by the birthday attack. Due to the constraint of granting only time O( 3 √ 2 ℓ ) for the collision search and setting ℓ > 6 log(α), even an adversary with quantum or parallel power is not able to make at least √ 2 ℓ random oracle queries. Thus, A has only negligible probability to respond in more than 1/4 of r rounds with a collision.
When considering only classical adversaries, we can also securely instantiate the random oracle by a hash function H that provides near-collision-resistance However, for adversaries A Q with quantum power, such an instantiation is not possible for any hash function. This stems from the fact that A Q can locally evaluate a hash function on quantum states which in turns allows to apply Grover's search algorithm. Then an adversary will find a collision in time 3 √ 2 ℓ with probability at least 1/2, and thus will be able to provide r/4 collisions with noticeable probability. The same result holds in the quantum-accessible random oracle model, since Grover's algorithm only requires (quantum) black-box access to the hash function.
Formal proofs of all statements are given in Appendix B.
oracle model implies security in the quantum-accessible random oracle model. The result in this section applies to signatures whose classical proof of security is a history-free reduction as defined next. Roughly speaking, history-freeness means that the classical proof of security simulates the random oracle and signature oracle in a history-free fashion. That is, its responses to queries do not depend on responses to previous queries or the query number. We then show that a number of classical signature schemes have a history-free reduction thereby proving their security in the quantum-accessible random oracle model.
Definition 4.1 (History-free Reduction). A random oracle model signature scheme S = (G, S O , V O ) has a history-free reduction from a hard problem P = (Game P , 0) if there is a proof of security that uses a classical PPT adversary A for S to construct a classical PPT algorithm B for problem P such that:
• Algorithm B for P contains four explicit classical algorithms: START, RAND Oc , SIGN Oc , and FINISH Oc . The latter three algorithms have access to a shared classical random oracle O c . These algorithms, except for RAND Oc , may also make queries to the challenger for problem P . The algorithms are used as follows:
(1) Given an instance x for problem P as input, algorithm B first runs START(x) to obtain (pk, z) where pk is a signature public key and z is private state to be used by B. Algorithm B sends pk to A and plays the role of challenger to A.
(2) When A makes a classical random oracle query to O(r), algorithm B responds with RAND Oc (r, z). Note that RAND is given the current query as input, but is unaware of previous queries and responses. (4) When A outputs a signature forgery candidate (m, σ), algorithm B outputs FINISH Oc (m, σ, z).
• There is an efficiently computable function INSTANCE(pk) which produces an instance x of problem P such that START(x) = (pk, z) for some z. Consider the process of first generating (sk, pk) from G(1 n ), and then computing x = INSTANCE(pk). The distribution of x generated in this way is negligibly close to the distribution of x generated in Game P .
• For fixed z, consider the classical random oracle O(r) = RAND Oc (r, z). Define a quantum oracle O quant , which transforms a basis element |x, y into |x, y ⊕ O(x) . We require that O quant is quantum computationally indistinguishable from a random oracle.
• SIGN Oc either aborts (and hence B aborts) or it generates a valid signature relative to the oracle O(r) = RAND Oc (r, z) with a distribution negligibly close to the correct signing algorithm. The probability that none of the signature queries abort is non-negligible.
• If (m, σ) is a valid signature forgery relative to the public key pk and oracle O(r) = RAND Oc (r, z) then the output of B (i.e. FINISH Oc (m, σ, z)) causes the challenger for problem P to output 1 with non-negligible probability. ⊓ ⊔ We now show that history-free reductions imply security in the quantum setting.
Theorem 4.2. Let S = (G, S, V ) be a signature scheme. Suppose that there is a history-free reduction that uses a classical PPT adversary A for S to construct a PPT algorithm B for a problem P . Further, assume that P is hard for polynomial-time quantum computers, and that quantum-accessible pseudorandom functions exist. Then S is secure in the quantum-accessible random oracle model.
Proof. The history-free reduction includes five (classical) algorithms START, RAND, SIGN, FINISH, and INSTANCE, as in Definition 4.1. We prove the quantum security of S using a sequence of games, where the first game is the standard quantum signature game with respect to S.
Game 0. Define Game 0 as the game a quantum adversary A Q plays for problem Sig-Forge(S). Assume towards contradiction that A Q has a non-negligible advantage.
Game 1. Define Game 1 as the following modification to Game 0 : after the challenger generates (sk, pk), it computes x ← INSTANCE(pk) as well as (pk, z) ← START(x). Further, instead of answering A Q 's quantum random oracle queries with a truly random oracle, the challenger simulates for A Q a quantum-accessible random oracle O quant as an oracle that maps a basis element |x, y into the element x, y ⊕ RAND Oc (x, z) , where O c is a truly (classical) random oracle. The history-free guarantee on RAND ensures that O quant is computationally indistinguishable from random for quantum adversaries. Therefore, the success probability of A Q in Game 1 is negligibly close to its success probability in Game 0 , and hence is non-negligible.
Game 2. Modify the challenger from Game 1 as follows: instead of generating (sk, pk) and computing x = INSTANCE(pk), start off by running the challenger for problem P . When that challenger sends x, then start the challenger from Game 1 using this x. Also, when A Q asks for a signature on m, answer with SIGN Oc (m, z). First, since INSTANCE is part of a history-free reduction, this change in how we compute x only negligibly affects the distribution of x, and hence the behavior of A Q . Second, as long as all signing algorithms succeed, changing how we answer signing queries only negligibly affects the behavior of A Q . Thus, the probability that A Q succeeds is the product of the following two probabilities:
• The probability that all of the signing queries are answered without aborting.
• The probability that A Q produces a valid forgery given that the signing queries were answered successfully.
The first probability is non-negligible by assumption, and the second is negligibly close to the success probability of A Q in Game 1 , which is also non-negligible. This means that the success probability of A Q in Game 2 is non-negligible.
Game 3. Define Game 3 as in Game 2 , except for two modifications to the challenger: First, it generates a key k for the quantum-accessible PRF. Then, to answer a random oracle query O quant (|φ ), the challenger applies the unitary transformation that takes a basis element |x, y into |x, y ⊕ PRF(k, x) . If the success probability in Game 3 was non-negligibly different from that of Game 2 , we could construct a distinguisher for PRF which plays both the role of A Q and the challenger. Hence, the success probability in Game 3 is negligibly close to that of Game 2 , and hence is also non-negligible. Given a quantum adversary that has non-negligible advantage in Game 3 we construct a quantum algorithm B Q that breaks problem P . When B Q receives instance x from the challenger for problem P , it computes (pk, z) ← START(x) and generates a key k for PRF. Then, it simulates A Q on pk. B Q answers random oracle queries using a quantum-accessible function built from RAND PRF(k,·) (·, z) as in Game 1. It answers signing queries using SIGN PRF(k,·) (·, z). Then, when A Q outputs a forgery candidate (m, σ), B Q computes FINISH PRF(k,·) (m, σ, z), and returns the result to the challenger for problem P .
Observe that the behavior of A Q in Game 3 is identical to that as a subroutine of B Q . Hence, A Q as a subroutine of B Q will output a valid forgery (m, σ) with non-negligible probability. If (m, σ) is a valid forgery, then since FINISH is part of a history-free reduction, FINISH PRF(k,·) (m, σ, z) will cause the challenger for problem P to accept with non-negligible probability. Thus, the probability that P accepts is also non-negligible, contradicting our assumption that P is hard for quantum computers.
Hence we have shown that any polynomial quantum algorithm has negligible advantage against problem Sig-Forge(S) which completes the proof.
⊓ ⊔
We note that, in every step of the algorithm, the adversary A Q remains in a pure state. This is because, in each game, A Q 's state is initially pure (since it is classical), and every step of the game either involves a unitary transformation, a partial measurement, or classical communication. In all three cases, if the state is pure before, it is also pure after.
We also note that we could have stopped at Game 2 and assumed that the cryptographic problem P is hard relative to a (quantum-accessible) random oracle. Assuming the existence of quantum-accessible pseudorandom functions allows us to draw the same conclusion in the standard (i.e., non-relativized) model at the expense of an extra assumption.
Secure Signatures From Preimage Sampleable Trapdoor Functions (PSF)
We now use Theorem 4.2 to prove the security of the Full Domain Hash signature scheme when instantiated with a preimage sampleable trapdoor function (PSF), such as the one proposed in [GPV08] . Loosely speaking, a PSF F is a tuple of PPT algorithms (G, Sample, f, f −1 ) where G(·) generates a key pair (pk, sk), f (pk, ·) defines an efficiently computable function, f −1 (sk, y) samples from the set of pre-images of y, and Sample(pk) samples x from the domain of f (pk, ·) such that f (pk, x) is statistically close to uniform in the range of f (pk, ·). The PSF of [GPV08] is not only one-way, but is also collision resistant.
Recall that the full domain hash (FDH) signature scheme [BR93] is defined as follows:
−1 ) be a trapdoor permutation, and O a hash function whose range is the same as the range of f . The full domain hash signature scheme is S = (G, T, V ) where:
Gentry et al. [GPV08] show that the FDH signature scheme can be instantiated with a PSF F = (G, Sample, f, f −1 ) instead of a trapdoor permutation. Call the resulting system FDH-PSF. They prove that FDH-PSF is secure against classical adversaries, provided that the pre-image sampling algorithm used during signing is derandomized (e.g. by using a classical PRF to generate its random bits). Their reduction is not quite history-free, but we show that it can be made history-free.
Consider the following reduction from a classical adversary A for the FDH-PSF scheme S to a classical collision finder B for F :
• On input pk, B computes START(pk) := (pk, pk), and simulates A on pk.
• When A queries O(r), B responds with RAND Oc (r, pk) := f (pk, Sample(1 n ; O c (r))).
• When A queries S(sk, m), B responds with SIGN Oc (m, pk) := Sample(1 n ; O c (m)).
• When A outputs (m, σ), B outputs FINISH Oc (m, σ, pk) := Sample 1 n ; O c (m) , σ .
In addition, we define INSTANCE(pk) := pk. Algorithms INSTANCE and START trivially satisfy the requirements of history-freeness (Definition 4.1).
Before showing that the above reduction is in history-free form, we need the following technical lemma whose proof is given in the appendix .
Lemma 4.4. Say A is a quantum algorithm that makesuantum oracle queries. Suppose further that we draw the oracle O from two distributions. The first is the random oracle distribution. The second is the distribution of oracles where the value of the oracle at each input x is identically and independently distributed by some distribution D whose variational distance is within ǫ from uniform. Then the variational distance between the distributions of outputs of A with each oracle is at most 4q
Proof Sketch. We show that there is a way of moving from O to O D such that the oracle is only changed on inputs in a set K where the sum of the amplitudes squared of all k ∈ K, over all queries made by A, is small. Thus, we can use Lemma 2.2 to show that the expected behavior of any algorithm making polynomially many quantum queries to O is only changed by a small amount. ⊓ ⊔ Lemma 4.4 shows that we can replace a truly random oracle O with an oracle O D distributed according to distribution D without impacting A, provided D is close to uniform. Note, however, that while this change only affects the output of A negligibly, the effects are larger than in the classical setting. If A only made classical queries to O, a simple hybrid argument shows that changing to O D affects the distribution of the output of A by at most qǫ, as opposed to 4q 2 √ ǫ in the quantum case. Thus, quantum security reductions that use Lemma 4.4 will not be as tight as their classical counterparts.
We now show that the reduction above is history-free.
Theorem 4.5. The reduction above applied to FDH-PSF is history-free.
Proof. The definition of a PSF implies that the distribution of f (pk, Sample(1 n )) is within ǫ sample of uniform, for some negligible ǫ sample . Now, since O(r) = RAND Oc (r, pk) = f (pk, Sample(1 n ; O c (r))) and O c is a true random oracle, the quantity O(r) is distributed independently according to a distribution that is ǫ sample away from uniform. Define a quantum oracle O quant which transforms the basis state |x, y into |x, y ⊕ O(x) . Using Lemma 4.4, for any algorithm B making q random oracle queries, the variational distance between the probability distributions of the outputs of B using a truly random oracle and the "not-quite" random oracle O quant is at most 4q 2 √ ǫ sample , which is still negligible. Hence, O quant is computationally indistinguishable from random.
Gentry et al. [GPV08] also show that SIGN Oc (m, pk) is consistent with RAND Oc (·, pk) for all queries, and that if A outputs a valid forgery (m, σ), FINISH Oc (m, σ, pk) produces a collision for F with probability 1 − 2 −E , where E is the minimum over all y in the range of f (pk, ·) of the min-entropy of the distribution on σ given f (pk, σ) = y. The PSF of Gentry et al. [GPV08] has super-logarithmic min-entropy, so 1 − 2 −E is negligibly close to 1, though any constant non-zero min-entropy will suffice to make the quantity a non-negligible fraction of 1.
⊓ ⊔
We note that the security proof of Gentry et al. [GPV08] is a tight reduction in the following sense: if the advantage of an adversary A for S is ǫ, the reduction gives a collision finding adversary B for F with advantage negligibly close to ǫ, provided that the lower bound over y in the range of f (pk, ·) of the min-entropy of σ given f (pk, σ) = y is super-logarithmic. If the PSF has a min-entropy of 1, the advantage of B is still ǫ/2.
The following corollary, which is the main result of this section, follows from Theorems (4.2) and (4.5).
Corollary 4.6. If quantum-accessible pseudorandom functions exist, and F is a secure PSF against quantum adversaries, then the FDH-PSF signature scheme is secure in the quantum-accessible random oracle model.
Secure Signatures from Claw-Free Permutations
In this section, we show how to use claw-free permutations to construct three signature schemes that have history-free reductions and are therefore secure in the quantum-accessible random oracle model. The first is the standard FDH from Definition 4.3, but when the underlying permutation is a claw-free permutation. We adapt the proof of Coron [Cor00] to give a history-free reduction. The second is the Katz and Wang [KW03] signature scheme, and we also modify their proof to get a history-free reduction. Lastly, following Gentry et al. [GPV08] , we note that claw-free permutations give rise to a pre-image sampleable trapdoor function (PSF), which can then be used in FDH to get a secure signature scheme as in Section 4.1. The Katz-Wang and FDH-PSF schemes from claw-free permutations give a tight reduction, whereas the Coron-based proof loses a factor of q s in the security reduction, where q s is the number of signing queries.
Recall that a claw-free pair of permutations [GMR88] is a pair of trapdoor permutations (F 1 , F 2 ), where
i ), with the following properties:
• For any key pk, f 1 (pk, ·) and f 2 (pk, ·) have the same domain and range.
• Given only pk, the probability that any PPT adversary can find a pair (x 1 , x 2 ) such that f 1 (pk, x 1 ) = f 2 (pk, x 2 ) is negligible. Such a pair is called a claw.
Dodis and Reyzin [DR03]
note that claw-free permutations are a generalization of trapdoor permutations with a random self-reduction. A random selfreduction is a way of taking a worst-case instance x of a problem, and converting it into a random instance y of the same problem, such that a solution to y gives a solution to x. Dodis and Reyzin [DR03] show that any trapdoor permutation with a random self reduction (e.g. RSA) gives a claw-free pair of permutations.
We note that currently there are no candidate pairs of claw-free permutations that are secure against quantum adversaries, but this may change in time.
FDH Signatures from Claw-Free Permutations Coron [Cor00] shows that the Full Domain Hash signature scheme, when instantiated with the RSA trapdoor permutation, has a tighter security reduction than the general Full Domain Hash scheme, in the classical world. That is, Coron's reduction loses a factor of approximately q s , the number of signing queries, as apposed to q h , the number of hash queries. Of course, the RSA trapdoor permutation is not secure against quantum adversaries, but his reduction can be applied to any claw-free permutation and is equivalent to a history-free reduction with similar tightness.
To construct a FDH signature scheme from a pair of claw-free permutations (F 1 , F 2 ), we simply instantiate FDH with F 1 , and ignore the second permutation F 2 , to yield the following signature scheme
• G is the generator for the pair of claw-free permutations.
•
We now present a history-free reduction for this scheme. The random oracle for this reduction, O c (r), returns a random pair (a, b) , where a is a random element from the domain of F 1 and F 2 , and b is a random element from {1, ..., p} for some p to be chosen later.
We construct history-free reduction from a classical adversary A for S to a classical adversary B for (F 1 , F 2 ). Algorithm B, on input pk, works as follows:
• Compute START(pk, y) = (pk, pk), and simulate A on pk. Notice that z = pk is the state saved by B.
• When A queries O(r), compute RAND Oc (r, pk). For each string r, RAND works as follows: compute (a, b) ← O c (r). If b = 1, return f 2 (pk, a). Otherwise, return f 1 (pk, a)
• When A queries S(sk, m), compute SIGN Oc (m, pk). SIGN works as follows: compute (a, b) ← O c (m) and return a if b = 1. Otherwise, fail.
• When A returns (m, σ), compute FINISH Oc (m, σ, pk). FINISH works as follows: compute (a, b) ← O c (m) and output (σ, a).
In addition, we have INSTANCE(pk) = pk and START(INSTANCE(pk)) = (pk, pk), so INSTANCE and START satisfy the required properties.
Theorem 4.7. The reduction above is in history-free form.
Proof. RAND
Oc (r, pk) is completely random and independently distributed, as f 1 (pk, a) and f 2 (pk, a) are both random (f b (pk, ·) is a permutation and a is truly random). As long as b = 1, where (a, b) = O c (m), SIGN Oc (m, pk) will be consistent with RAND. This is because V
and SIGN
Oc (m, pk)) = a. Thus, the equality holds. The probability over all signature queries of no failure is (1 − 1/p) qSIGN . If we chose p = q SIGN , this quantity is at least e −1 − o(1), which is non-negligible. Suppose A returns a valid forgery (m, σ), meaning A never asked for a forgery on m and f 1 (sk, σ) = RAND Oc (m, pk). If b = 1 (where (a, b) = O c (m)), then we have f 1 (sk, σ) = RAND Oc (m, pk) = f 2 (pk, a), meaning that (σ, a) is a claw. Since A never asked for a signature on m, there is no way A could have figured out a, so the case where b = 1 and a is the preimage of O(m) under f 2 , and the case where b = 1 and a is the preimage of O(m) under f 1 are indistinguishable.
Thus, b = 1 with probability 1/p. Thus, B converts a valid signature into a claw with non-negligible probability.
⊓ ⊔ Corollary 4.8. If quantum-accessible pseudorandom functions exists, and (F 1 , F 2 ) is a pair claw-free trapdoor permutations, then the FDH scheme instantiated with F 1 is secure against quantum adversaries.
Note that in this reduction, our simulated random oracle is truly random, so we do not need to rely on Lemma 4.4. Hence, the tightness of the reduction will be the same as the classical setting. Namely, if the quantum adversary A has advantage ǫ when making q SIGN signature queries, B will have advantage approximately ǫ/q SIGN .
The Katz-Wang Signature Scheme In this section, we consider a variant of FDH due to Katz and Wang [KW03]. This scheme admits an almost tight security reduction in the classical world. That is, if an adversary has advantage ǫ, the reduction gives a claw finder with advantage ǫ/2. Their proof of security is not in history-free form, but it can be modified so that it is in history-free form. Given a pair of trapdoor permutation (F 1 , F 2 ), the construction is as follows:
• G is the key generator for F .
We construct a history-free reduction from an adversary A for S to an adversary B for (F 1 , F 2 ). The random oracle for this reduction, O c (r), generates a random pair (a, b), where a is a random element from the domain of F 1 and F 2 , and b is a random bit. On input pk, B works as follows:
• When A queries O(b, r), compute RAND Oc (b, r, pk). For each string (b, r), RAND works as follows: compute (a,
• When A queries S(sk, m), compute SIGN Oc (m, pk). SIGN works as follows: compute (a, b) = O c (m) and return a.
• When A returns (m, σ), compute FINISH Oc (m, σ, pk). FINISH works as follows: compute (a, b) = O c (m). If σ = a, abort. Otherwise, output (σ, a).
Theorem 4.9. The reduction above is in history-free form.
Proof. RAND
Oc (b, r, pk) is completely random and independently distributed, as f 1 (pk, a) and f 2 (pk, a) are both random (f b is a permutation and a is truly random). Observe that f 1 (pk, SIGN Oc (m, pk)) = f 1 (pk, a) = O(b, m) where
. Thus, signing queries are always answered with a valid signature, and the distribution of signatures is identical to that of the correct signing algorithm since b is chosen uniformly. Suppose A returns a valid forgery (m, σ). Let (a, b) = O c (m). There are two cases, corresponding to whether σ corresponds to a signature using b or 1 − b.
In the first case, we have f 1 (pk, σ) = O(b, m) = f 1 (pk, a), meaning σ = a, so we abort. Otherwise, f 1 (pk, σ) = O(1 − b, m) = f 2 (pk, a), so (σ, a) form a claw. Since the adversary never asked for a signing query on m, these two cases are indistinguishable by the same logic as the proof for FDH. Thus, the probability of failure is at most a half, which is non-negligible.
⊓ ⊔ Corollary 4.10. If quantum-accessible pseudorandom functions exists, and (F 1 , F 2 ) is a pair claw-free trapdoor permutations, then the Katz-Wang signature scheme instantiated with F 1 is secure against quantum adversaries.
As in the case of FDH, our simulated quantum-accessible random oracle is truly random, so we do not need to rely on Lemma 4.4. Thus, the tightness of our reduction is the same as the classical case. In particular, if the quantum adversary A Q has advantage ǫ then B will have advantage ǫ/2.
PSF Signatures from Claw-Free Permutations Gentry et al. [GPV08] note that Claw-Free Permutations give rise to pre-image sampleable trapdoor functions (PSFs). These PSFs can then be used to construct an FDH signature scheme as in Section 4.1.
Given a pair of claw-free permutations (F 1 , F 2 ), define the following PSF: G is just the generator for the pair of permutations. Sample(pk) generates a random bit b and random x in the domain of f b , and returns (x, b). f (pk, x, b) = f b (pk, x), and f −1 (sk, y) = (f −1 b (sk, y), b) for a random b. Suppose we have a collision ((x 1 , b 1 ), (x 2 , b 2 )) for this PSF. Then
Hence, we can instantiate FDH with this PSF to get the following signature scheme:
• G is the generator for the permutations.
The security of this scheme follows from Corollary 4.6, with a similar tightness guarantee (this PSF has only a pre-image min-entropy of 1, which results in a loss of a factor of two in the tightness of the reduction). In particular, if we have a quantum adversary A Q for E with advantage ǫ, we get a quantum algorithm B Q for the PSF with advantage ǫ/2, which gives us a quantum algorithm C Q that finds claws of (F 1 , F 2 ) with probability ǫ/2.
Encryption Schemes in the Quantum-Accessible Random Oracle Model
In this section, we prove the security of two encryption schemes. The first is the BR encryption scheme due to Bellare and Rogaway [BR93], which we show is CPA secure. The second is a hybrid generalization of the BR scheme, which we show is CCA secure. Ideally, we could define a general type of classical reduction like we did for signatures, and show that such a reduction implies quantum security. Unfortunately, defining a history-free reduction for encryption is considerably more complicated than for signatures. We therefore directly prove the security of two random oracle schemes in the quantum setting.
CPA Security of BR Encryption
In this section, we prove the security of the BR encryption scheme [BR93] against quantum adversaries:
Definition 5.1 (BR Encryption Scheme). Let F = (G 0 , f, f −1 ) be an injective trapdoor function, and O a hash function with the same domain as f (pk, ·). We define the following encryption scheme, E = (G, E, D) where:
for a randomly chosen r.
A candidate quantum-immune injective trapdoor function can be built from hard problems on lattices [PW08].
Theorem 5.2. If quantum-accessible pseudorandom functions exists and F is a quantum-immune injective trapdoor function, then E is quantum CPA secure.
We omit the proof of Theorem 5.2 because the CPA security of the BR encryption scheme is a special case of the CCA security of the hybrid encryption scheme in the next section.
CCA Security of Hybrid Encryption
We now prove the CCA security of the following standard hybrid encryption, a generalization of the BR encryption scheme scheme [BR93], built from an injective trapdoor function and symmetric key encryption scheme.
Definition 5.3 (Hybrid Encryption Scheme). Let F = (G 0 , f, f −1 ) be an injective trapdoor function, and E S = (E S , D S ) be a CCA secure symmetric key encryption scheme, and O a hash function. We define the following encryption scheme, E = (G, E, D) where: m) ) for a randomly chosen r.
We note that the BR encryption scheme from the previous section is a special case of this hybrid encryption scheme where E S is the one-time pad. That is,
Theorem 5.4. If quantum-accessible pseudorandom functions exists, F is a quantum-immune injective trapdoor function, and E S is a quantum CCA secure symmetric key encryption scheme, then E is quantum CCA secure.
Proof. Suppose we have an adversary A Q that breaks E. We start with the standard security game for CCA secure encryption:
Game 0. Define Game 0 as the game a quantum adversary A Q plays for problem Asym-CCA(E).
Game 1. Define Game 1 as the following game: the challenger generates (sk, pk) ← G(1 n ), a random r in the domain of F , a random k in the key space of E S , and computes y = f (pk, r). The challenger has access to a quantum-accessible random oracle O q whose range is the key space of E S . It then sends pk to A Q . The challenger answers queries as follows:
• Random oracle queries are answered with the random oracle O quant , which takes a basis element |x, y into |x, y ⊕ O q (f (pk, x)) .
• Decryption queries on (y ′ , c ′ ) are answered as follows:
Case 2: If y = y ′ , respond with D S (O q (y ′ ), c ′ ).
• The challenge query on (m 0 , m 1 ) is answered as follows: choose a random b. Then, respond with (y, E S (k, m b )).
When A Q responds with b ′ , we say that A Q won if b = b ′ . Observe that, because f is injective and O q is random, the oracle O quant is a truly random oracle with the same range as O q . The challenge ciphertext (y, c) seen by A Q is distributed identically to that of Game 0 . Further, it is a valid encryption of m b relative to the random oracle being
Which is correct. Likewise, if O q (y) = k, the decryption of (y, c ′ ) is also correct. Thus, the view of A Q in Game 1 is identical to that in Game 0 if O q (y) = k. We now make the following observations:
• The challenge query and decryption query answering algorithms never query O q on y.
• Each quantum random oracle query from the adversary to O quant leads to a quantum random oracle query from the challenger to O q . The query magnitude of y in the challenger's query to O q is the same as the query magnitude of r in the adversary's query O quant .
Let ǫ be the sum of the square magnitudes of y over all queries made to O q (i.e. the total query probability of y). This is identical to the total query probability of r over all queries A Q makes to O quant .
We now construct a quantum algorithm B
Oq
F that uses a quantum-accessible random oracle O q , and inverts f with probability ǫ/q, where q is the number of random oracle queries made by A Q . B Oq F takes as input (pk, y), and its goal is to output r = f −1 (sk, y). B
Oq F works as follows:
• Generate a random k in the key space of E S . Also, generate a random i ∈ {1, ..., q}. Now, send pk to A Q and play the role of challenger to A Q .
• Answer random oracle queries with the random oracle O quant , which takes a basis element |x, y into |x, y ⊕ O q (f (pk, x)) .
• Answer decryption queries on (y ′ , c ′ ) as follows:
• Answer the challenge query on (m 0 , m 1 ) as follows: choose a random b. Then, respond with (y, E S (k, m b )).
• At the ith random oracle query, sample the query to get r ′ , and output r ′ and terminate.
Comparing our definition of B
F to Game 1 , we can conclude that the view seen by A Q in both cases is identical. Thus, the total query probability that A Q makes to O quant at the point r is ǫ. Hence, the probability that B Oq F outputs r is ǫ/q. If we assume that F is secure against quantum adversaries that use a quantumaccessible random oracle, then this quantity, and hence ǫ, must be negligible. As in the case of signatures (Section 4), we can replace this assumption with the assumption that F is secure against quantum adversaries (i.e. with no access to a quantum random oracle) and that pseudorandom functions exists to reach the same conclusion.
Since ǫ is negligible, we can change O q (y) = k in Game 1 , thus getting a game identical to Game 0 from the adversary's point of view. Notice that in Game 0 and Game 1 , A Q is in a pure state because we are only applying unitary transformations, performing measurements, or performing classical communication. We are only changing the oracle at a point with negligible total query probability, so Lemma 2.2 tells us that making this change only affects the distribution of the outcome of Game 1 negligibly. This allows us to conclude that the success probability of A Q in Game 1 is negligibly close to that in Game 0 . Now, assume that the success probability of A Q in Game 1 is non-negligible. We now define a quantum algorithm B Oq ES that uses a quantum-accessible random oracle O q to break the CCA security of E S . B Oq ES works as follows:
• On input 1 n , generate (sk, pk) ← G(1 n ). Also, generate a random r, and compute y = f (pk, r). Now send pk to A Q and play the role of challenger to A Q .
• Answer the challenge query on (m 0 , m 1 ) by forwarding the pair E S . When the challenger responds with c (which equals E S (k, m b ) for some b), return (y, c) to A Q .
• When A Q outputs b ′ , output b ′ and halt.
ES to that of Game 1 , we can conclude that the view of A Q in both cases is identical. Thus, A Q succeeds with non-negligible probability. If A Q succeeds, it means it returned b, meaning B Oq ES also succeeded. Thus, we have an algorithm with a quantum random oracle that breaks E S . This is a contradiction if E S is CCA secure against quantum adversaries with access to a quantum random oracle, which holds since E S is CCA secure against quantum adversaries and quantum-accessible pseudorandom functions exist, by assumption.
Thus, the success probability of A Q in Game 1 is negligible, so the success probability of A Q in Game 0 is also negligible. Hence, we have shown that all polynomial time quantum adversaries have negligible advantage in breaking in breaking the CCA security of E, so E is CCA secure.
⊓ ⊔
We briefly explain why Theorem 5.2 is a special case of Theorem 5.4. Notice that, in the above proof, B ES only queries its decryption oracle when answering decryption queries made by A Q , and that it never makes encryption queries. Hence, if A Q makes no decryption queries, B ES makes no queries at all except the challenge query. If we are only concerned with the CPA security of E, we then only need E S to be secure against adversaries that can only make the challenge query. Further, if we only let A Q make a challenge query with messages of length n, then E S only has to be secure against adversaries making challenges of a specific length. But this is exactly the model in which the one-time pad is unconditionally secure. Hence, the BR encryption scheme is secure, and we have proved Theorem 5.2.
Conclusion
We have shown that great care must be taken if using the random oracle model when arguing security against quantum attackers. Proofs in the classical case should be reconsidered, especially in case the quantum adversary can access the random oracle with quantum states. We also developed conditions for translating security proofs in the classical random oracle model to the quantum random oracle model. We applied these tools to certain signature and encryption schemes.
The foremost question raised by our results is in how far techniques for "classical random oracles" can be applied in the quantum case. This stems from the fact that manipulating or even observing the interaction with the quantumaccessible random oracle would require measurements of the quantum states. That, however, prevents further processing of the query in a quantum manner. We gave several examples of schemes that remain secure in the quantum setting, provided quantum-accessible pseudorandom functions exist. The latter primitive seems to be fundamental to simulate random oracles in the quantum world. Showing or disproving the existence of such pseudorandom functions is thus an important step.
Many classical random oracle results remain open in the quantum random oracle settings. It is not known how to prove security of generic FDH signatures as well as signatures derived from the Fiat-Shamir heuristic in the quantum random oracle model. Similarly, a secure generic transformation from CPA to CCA security in the quantum RO model is still open.
A Definitions
Definition A.1 (Trapdoor Permutation). A trapdoor permutation is a triple of functions F = (G, f, f −1 ) where:
• G(1 n ) generates a private/public key pair (sk, pk).
• f (pk, ·) is a permutation for all pk.
• f −1 (sk, ·) is the inverse of f (pk, ·) for all (pk, sk) generated by G. That is, f −1 (sk, f (pk, x)) = x and f (pk, f −1 (sk, y)) = y.
For a trapdoor permutation F , we define the problem Inv(F ) = (Game(F ), 0) where Game(F ) is the following game between a quantum adversary A and the challenger Ch: Ch, on input n, runs G(1 n ) to obtain (sk, pk) and generates a random y in the range of f (pk, ·). It sends (pk, y) to A. A is allowed to make quantum random oracle queries O(·). When A outputs x, Ch outputs 1 if and only if f (pk, x) = y. Definition A.2. A trapdoor permutation F is secure against quantum adversaries if Inv(F ) is hard for quantum computers.
The following definition is due to [GPV08] : Definition A.3 (Preimage Sampleable Trapdoor Function). A quadruple of functions F = (G, Sample, f, f −1 ) is a trapdoor collision-resistant hash function with preimage sampling (PSF) if:
• G(1 n ) generates secret and public keys (sk, pk).
• f (pk, ·) has domain D and range R.
• Sample(1 n ) samples from a distribution on D such that for all pk the distribution f pk, Sample(1 n ) is within ǫ sample of uniform.
• f −1 (sk, y) generates an x such that f (pk, x) = y. The distribution is within ǫ pre of the conditional distribution of Sample() given f (pk, x) = y, where ǫ pre is negligible.
• Pre-image Min-entropy: For all y ∈ R, the probability of any element in the conditional distribution of Sample(1 n ) given f (pk, x) = y is less than ǫ prob , where ǫ prob is negligible.
For a PSF, we define two problems: Inv(F ) is identical to the problem with the same name for trapdoor permutations, and Col(F ) = (Game(F ), 0) where Game(F ) is the following game between a quantum adversary A and the challenger Ch: Ch, on input n, runs G(1 n ) to obtain (sk, pk), and sends pk to A. A is allowed to make quantum random oracle queries O(·). When A outputs a pair (x 1 , x 2 ), Ch outputs 1 if and only if both x 1 = x 2 and f (pk, x 1 ) = f (pk, x 2 ). Definition A.4. A PSF F is secure against quantum adversaries if Inv(F ) and Col(F ) are both hard for quantum computers.
[GPV08] construct a PSF whose security is based on the hardness of lattice problems.
Signature schemes. We next review signature schemes using our unified notation. • O is a random oracle.
• G(1 n ) generates a pair (sk, pk) where sk is the signer's private key, and pk is the public key.
• S O (sk, m) generates a signature σ.
• V O (pk, m, σ) returns 1 if and only if σ is a valid signature on m. We require that V O (pk, m, S O (sk, m)) = 1 for all m and (sk, pk) generated by G.
For a signature scheme S, we define the problem Sig−F orge(S) = (Game(S), 0) where Game(S) is the following game between a quantum adversary A and the challenger Ch O : Ch O , on input n, runs G(1 n ) to obtain (sk, pk). It then sends pk to A. A is allowed to make quantum random oracle queries O(·) and classical signature queries S O (sk, ·) to Ch O . When A outputs a forgery candidate (m, σ), Ch O outputs 1 if and only if A never asked for a signature on m and σ is a valid signature for m (V O (pk, m, σ) = 1).
Definition A.6. A signature scheme S is secure against quantum adversaries if Sig − F orge(S) is hard for quantum computers.
Encryption. We next review encryption systems using our notation.
Definition A.7 (Symmetric Key Encryption Scheme). A symmetric key random oracle encryption scheme is a pair of functions E = (E O , D O ) where:
• D O (k, c) computes the plaintext m corresponding to ciphertext c. We require that
For a symmetric key encryption scheme E, we define the problem Sym−CCA(E) = (Game(E), • G(1 n ) generates a private/public key pair (sk, pk)
• E O (pk, m) generates a ciphertext c.
• D O (sk, c) computes the plaintext m corresponding to ciphertext c. We require that
For a symmetric key encryption scheme E, we define the problem Asym − CCA(E) = (Game(E), Definition A.10 (Asymmetric Key CCA Security). An Asymmetric key encryption scheme E is Chosen Ciphertext Attack (CCA) secure against quantum adversaries if Asym − CCA(E) is hard for quantum computers.
B Security of the IS * Protocol
To prove security of our protocol we need to show that an adversary A after interacting with an honest prover P * , can subsequently not impersonate P * such that V * accepts the identification.
Security against Classical Adversaries. We first show that the IS * protocol is secure in the (standard) random oracle model against classical adversaries and then discuss that there exist hash functions, which can securely replace the random oracle.
Thus, for a constant α, and setting r = poly(n) the above term is negligible in n. However, then, the overall success probability of A is negligible as well.
When considering classical adversaries only, we can securely instantiate the random oracle in the IS * scheme by a hash function H that provides nearcollision-resistance close to the birthday bound. Under this assumption, the security proof of our identification scheme carries over to the standard model, as well. (We omit a formal proof, as it follows the argumentation of Lemma B.1 closely.) Note that it is a particular requirement of the SHA-3 competition [NIS07] , that the hash function candidates achieve collision-resistance approximately up to the birthday bound and provide this property also for any fixed subset of the hash functions' output bits. Thus, all remaining SHA-3 candidates (or at least the winner of the competition) is supposed to be quasi-optimal near-collisionresistant.
Security against Quantum Adversaries. We now show that such a result is impossible in the quantum world, i.e., for any hash function H there exists a quantum-adversary A Q that breaks the IS * protocol (regardless of the security of the underlying identification scheme). This contrasts with the security that can still be achieved in the (classical) random oracle model:
Lemma B.2. Let IS Q = (IS.KGen, P, V) be a secure quantum-immune identification scheme. Then for any efficient quantum adversary A Q and ℓ > 6 log(α) the protocol IS * is secure in the random oracle model.
Proof. By assuming that IS Q is a quantum-immune identification scheme, an adversary A Q trying to convince a verifier V * in the IS * protocol must provide at least r/4 many collisions in the first stage of the protocol. Thus, we have to show that a quantum adversary A Q can succeed in the collision-search with negligible probability only.
Note that in order to gain advantage of the quantum speed-up (e.g., by applying Grover's search algorithm) the random oracle H, resp. the indicator function based on H, has to be evaluated on quantum states, i.e., on superpositions of many input strings. However, by granting A Q only classical access to the random oracle, it is not able to exploit its additional quantum power to find collisions on H. Thus, A Q has to stick to the classical collision-search on a random oracle, which we have proven to succeed in r/4 of r rounds with negligible probability, due to the constraint of making at most α · 3 √ 2 ℓ oracle queries per round (see proof of Lemma B.1 for details).
We now show that our IS * scheme becomes totally insecure for any instantiation of the random oracle by a hash function H. Lemma B.3. There exist an efficient quantum adversary A Q such that for any hash function H = (H.KGen, H.Eval) the protocol IS * is insecure.
Proof. For the proof, we show that a quantum-adversary A Q can find collisions on H in at least r/4 rounds with non-negligible probability. To this end, we first transform the classical hash function H into a quantum-accessible functionFor a bit string x, the probability that sampling |φ results in x is | x, φ | 2 . Let S P be the set of basis elements x such that x satisfied P . The probability that sampling |φ results in a string satisfying P is then given by
This also is the square of the length of the projection of φ onto the subspace spanned by S P . So, let φ P and φ ′ P be the projections of φ and φ ′ onto the space spanned by S P . The probability that sampling |φ (resp. |φ ′ ) results in a string satisfying P is simply ǫ = |φ P | 2 (resp. ǫ ′ = φ ′ P 2 ). Projections only decrease distance, so by the triangle inequality,
Reversing the roles of |φ and |φ ′ gives us the other inequality.
Lemma C.2. Let A be an quantum algorithm that makes at mostueries to quantum random oracle O. Fix a y in the co-domain of O. The expected value of the total query probability of all x such that O(x) = y is at most Proof. Suppose we have an oracle O ′ for which the output on every input is distributed identically and independently, with a uniform distribution over {0, 1} m \ {y}. We now modify the oracle as follows: for each input x, with probability 2 −m , replace the output with y. This oracle is now a random oracle, so its distribution is identical to O.
Let σ i be the total query magnitude over the first i − 1 queries of x such that we change O ′ (x). Let δ i be the query magnitude of those x in the ith query. Let γ i be the Euclidean distance between the state of A at the ith query when using oracle O ′ and the modified oracle O. By (2.2), γ i ≤ (i − 1)σ i . Let ρ i be the query magnitude of x such that O(x) = y (which is the same as the query probability of x such that we changed O ′ (x)). By the above lemma,
Now, observe that since we are deciding whether to change the output of a query point at random and independently, the expected query probability of the points that we changed in each query is exactly 2 . This result is not surprising, as it implies that any quantum algorithm which is to output a preimage of y with overwhelming probability must make O( √ 2 −m ) quantum oracle queries, which is well known lower bound for the unstructured search problem (see Bennett et al.
[BBBV97] for more). Summing over allueries gives the expected query probability of x such that O(x) = y to be at most 2 × 2 −m q 3 .
Proof of Lemma 4.4. We are given a random oracle O and a distribution D that is ǫ-close to uniform. Observe that: ǫ = 
